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Geoeconomics Meets Geopolitics 
China’s New Economic and Foreign Policy Initiatives 
Hanns Günther Hilpert and Gudrun Wacker 
China’s new leadership has launched a series of foreign policy and economic initiatives 
whose implications reach far beyond their own region. Washington disapproves of Bei-
jing’s plans, regarding the proposed financial institutions in particular as a challenge 
to their established Western-dominated counterparts. China’s response is that these are 
sensible and important additions to the existing architecture. European states failed to 
fall in line with the US stance, and many became founding members of the Asian Infra-
structure Investment Bank (AIIB). China’s overarching vision of “new Silk Roads” inte-
grating Asia and Europe by land and sea also demands a European response. In order 
to achieve better coordination than they managed over the AIIB question, the European 
Union and European states need to discuss and evaluate the economic and political 
dimensions of the Chinese initiatives in their overall context. 
 
Under the new leadership that assumed 
office in 2012/13, China has displayed 
a striking degree of activism in foreign 
policy, including the economic sphere. Its 
initiatives possess the potential to cause 
lasting geoeconomic change affecting the 
economic centre/periphery structures of 
Asia, if not of the world. 
China’s New External Initiatives 
At their sixth summit in July 2014 in Forta-
leza, Brazil, the BRICS states (Brazil, Russia, 
India, China, South Africa) officially founded 
their New Development Bank (NDB), with 
an initial authorised capital of $100 billion. 
At the same meeting, the five states also 
launched a $100 billion Contingent Reserve 
Arrangement (CRA), a swap financing in-
strument designed to reduce their reliance 
on the International Monetary Fund (IMF) 
and the US dollar. 
Almost a year earlier, in September 2013, 
Chinese head of state and Communist Party 
General Secretary Xi Jinping had presented 
his vision of a “new Silk Road” on his first 
foreign trip to Central Asia (“Silk Road eco-
nomic belt”), adding the idea of a “twenty-
first century maritime Silk Route” during a 
visit to Southeast Asia one month later. The 
objective is to connect China politically and 
commercially by land and sea to its neigh-
bours in the region, to West Asia, and ulti-
mately to Africa and Europe. Thus, this 
concept has much broader geographical 
implications than the earlier new Silk Road 
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idea propagated by China back in the 
1990s. Beijing has already set up a $40 
billion “Silk Road Fund” for the land/sea 
initiative, known for short as “One Belt, 
One Road”. 
Lack of Russian support has thus far 
blocked Chinese efforts to create a develop-
ment bank for the Shanghai Cooperation 
Organisation (SCO). However, the grouping 
may acquire its first new members this 
year, in the guise of India and Pakistan. 
At the October 2013 meeting of the Asia-
Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) in 
Bali, Indonesia, Xi Jinping announced the 
founding of yet another development bank: 
the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank 
(AIIB), to be devoted exclusively to financ-
ing infrastructure projects. From the Chi-
nese perspective it would complement the 
Asian Development Bank (ADB), which has 
been in existence since 1966. As in the case 
of the NDB, the authorised capital is to be 
$100 billion, of which China will contribute 
up to half. 
In parallel to these two multilateral 
development bank initiatives, China has 
also extended considerable bilateral prom-
ises of financial support and infrastructure 
investment. Its engagement extends around 
the entire globe, with recipients including 
Africa ($5 billion), Latin America ($35 bil-
lion), Central and Eastern Europe ($10 bil-
lion), Venezuela ($20 billion) and China’s 
western neighbour Pakistan ($46 billion). 
On his state visit to the latter in April 2015, 
Xi Jinping agreed the establishment of a 
transport corridor to the Indian Ocean, as 
well as numerous power generation projects. 
Trade policy is already an established in-
strument of Chinese economic diplomacy. 
At the November 2014 APEC summit, 
which China hosted in Beijing, Xi revived 
the idea of a Free Trade Area of the Asia-
Pacific (FTAAP). China concluded negotia-
tions on bilateral free trade agreements 
with Australia and South Korea immediately 
before the summit, adding to similar agree-
ments with, among others, the ASEAN 
states, Hong Kong, Taiwan, Pakistan, New 
Zealand, Chile, Peru, Costa Rica, Switzer-
land and Iceland. China’s current trade 
policy priority, meanwhile, is the Regional 
Comprehensive Economic Partnership 
(RCEP), aiming at the harmonisation of 
existing bilateral free trade agreements 
between ASEAN and six of its partners. 
China’s new proactive diplomacy also 
manifests itself in a willingness to host 
international meetings, such as the May 
2014 summit of the Conference on Inter-
action and Confidence-Building Measures 
in Asia (CICA). This organisation was ini-
tiated in the early 1990s by Kazakh Presi-
dent Nursultan Nazarbayev and comprises 
a very diverse spectrum of members. At 
the meeting, Xi Jinping argued that it was 
time for Asians to take charge of their own 
security (in other words, without the United 
States), which caused a stir in Western 
media. Beijing hopes that the 2014 upgrade 
of the Xiangshan Forum to an annual con-
ference with official participation will 
become an equivalent to the more Western-
dominated Shangri-La Dialogue in Singa-
pore. 
Altogether China’s new leadership is pur-
suing a proactive foreign policy and seeking 
much more strongly to shape its own en-
vironment rather than simply reacting to 
events. Economic diplomacy plays a central 
role. Geographically the priorities lie in 
China’s now more broadly defined “greater 
neighbourhood”, where Xi Jinping speaks 
of a “community of shared interests, desti-
ny and responsibility” or also a “communi-
ty of common destiny”. 
Motives and Interests 
Through the new visions, formats and in-
struments outlined above, China demon-
strates its willingness to take on greater 
global and regional responsibility. As such, 
it is fulfilling a demand made by the indus-
trialised West – but on its own terms and in 
selected areas aligned with its own interests. 
The new financial institutions plainly 
also owe their existence to frustration over 
the failure to reform the World Bank, ADB 
and IMF to accommodate the interests of 
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countries outside the OECD sphere. Resist-
ance from the US Congress still prevents 
implementation of the 2010 decision to 
enhance the IMF voting rights of emerging 
economies (all the BRICS states together 
possess only 11 percent, China itself just 
3.81 percent). In the ADB the United States 
and Japan are resisting overdue reforms 
of voting rights and quotas. And if the two 
major new free trade agreements – between 
the European Union and the United States 
(Transatlantic Trade and Investment Part-
nership, TTIP) and between twelve APEC 
members including the United States and 
Japan (Trans-Pacific Partnership, TPP) – 
actually come into being, China would find 
itself outside the two new major trading 
blocs, as would the other BRICS states. Bei-
jing regards the TPP in particular as a US 
attempt to harm China economically 
through trade diversion and isolate it diplo-
matically in Asia. The AIIB and China’s 
other initiatives can be interpreted as its 
response. Not only are they open to all coun-
tries to join without preconditions, but 
they could also become the motor of region-
al economic integration, because eliminat-
ing physical infrastructure deficits prom-
ises a much greater boost to Asian conver-
gence and connection of regional supply 
chains than the lowering of tariffs and 
trade barriers proposed in the planned free 
trade agreement. Moreover, the AIIB in-
volves the all ten ASEAN countries, whereas 
the TPP in its present composition splits 
ASEAN by including only Brunei, Singapore, 
Malaysia and Vietnam. 
China’s regional initiatives (AIIB and Silk 
Roads) also serve to polish its image in its 
own neighbourhood, which has become 
tarnished in recent years. While its terri-
torial claims, which Beijing pursued con-
siderably more forcefully after 2009/10 
than in the early 2000s, have not vanished 
with the new engagement, China is seeking 
to bring itself into play again as an attrac-
tive partner. 
China also hopes that embedding in a 
quasi-multilateral framework will lend 
greater legitimacy and acceptance to its 
infrastructure projects in partner countries. 
For example, in Myanmar, Kyrgyzstan and 
Sri Lanka there has been marked criticism 
of bilateral cooperation with China and the 
resulting dependencies. 
The initiatives also possess a domestic 
economic dimension, where China hopes 
to boost its flattening domestic growth, 
the “new normal” of the Chinese economy 
with growth rates down to around 7 per-
cent. Many provinces and cities are seeking 
to attract projects in the context of the two 
Silk Roads. AIIB-funded contracts are ex-
pected to fall overwhelmingly to Chinese 
businesses. The Chinese domestic infra-
structure expansion has produced large, 
highly capable enterprises that are now 
in a position to compete abroad with low 
prices, acceptable quality and demonstrable 
project experience. 
Beyond their benefits to the domestic 
economy, the external economic initiatives 
also possess geoeconomic significance. Thus 
it can be assumed that the planned invest-
ments will intensify China’s regional pull 
and firmly establish the “Middle Kingdom” 
as Asia’s economic centre of gravity. China 
is the natural heart of “Factory Asia” and its 
geopolitics promote an Asian spatial eco-
nomic structuration centred on the country. 
Finally, the outlined external economic 
initiatives effectively support China’s auton-
omy-driven currency and finance policies. 
From the Chinese perspective, investing its 
own dollar reserves in foreign infrastruc-
ture projects represents a more politically 
and economically prudent use of foreign 
reserves than purchasing US treasury bonds. 
At the same time, the planned infrastruc-
ture investments directly promote the use 
of the Chinese national currency, the ren-
minbi (RMB), as a means of payment in 
international trade in goods and services. 
In the medium term the renminbi is also 
likely to gain in attractiveness as an invest-
ment vehicle. For China the AIIB represents 
another step towards global financial and 
currency multipolarity, and greater inde-
pendence from the US-dominated Bretton 
Woods institutions. 
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Overall Chinese foreign policy and eco-
nomic diplomacy exhibit an integrated 
approach, where the AIIB initiative is about 
a great deal more than just a regional devel-
opment bank. 
The Test of Reality 
While the five BRICS states are the sole 
founding members of the NDB, any country 
represented at the United Nations may join. 
The Bank is intended to promote investment 
in infrastructure and (less concretely) sus-
tainable development – first and foremost 
in the BRICS states themselves, but also in 
other emerging economies and developing 
countries. Membership of and participation 
in the AIIB and the Silk Roads projects was, 
on the other hand, open from the outset. 
In the case of the AIIB, China invited 
other states to join as founding members. 
But the rules under which it will operate 
have yet to be defined in detail. The Bank’s 
charter is due to be finalised by 30 June 
2015, which would allow it to be up and 
running by the end of the year. On present 
information participating Asian states will 
hold the majority of its capital stock, with 
the share held by non-Asian states to be 
capped at 25 percent (lower than in the 
ADB). Unless Japan decides to join, China 
may end up holding roughly 40 percent. 
The purpose of the Bank is to fund trans-
port links (roads, rail), airports and sea-
ports, telecommunications links, water 
management and affordable housing in 
Asian developing countries. 
The Silk Road initiatives – “One Belt, One 
Road” – represent a comprehensive vision 
whose outlines were recently laid out in a 
paper by the National Development and 
Reform Commission (NDRC). The focus here 
is largely on expanding transport and ener-
gy corridors, connectivity, and new links 
between Asia and Europe. The concept also 
integrates projects already under way into 
its broader scope, such as the China–Paki-
stan and Bangladesh–China–India–Myan-
mar economic corridors. But the plan is 
largely for bilateral cooperations between 
China and the individual countries along 
the two major land and sea routes. Even 
after the official announcement of the Silk 
Road fund in November 2014 ($40 billion) 
it remains unclear what concrete form co-
operation will in fact take. 
The unstable security situation in certain 
countries earmarked for the concept repre-
sents a fundamental problem. For example, 
plans for the corridor through Pakistan had 
to be modified: instead of traversing Balo-
chistan in western Pakistan the route will 
initially pass through Lahore and Islamabad 
to the port of Gwadar. But this bypasses 
exactly the areas in most urgent need of de-
velopment. So while Xi Jinping postulates 
that development generates stability, this 
example demonstrates that development 
also presupposes a certain level of stability. 
The various initiatives are interwoven. 
For example, both the NDB and the AIIB 
could be tapped for funding infrastructure 
projects in India. And while the Silk Road 
fund represents a dedicated resource for 
projects coming under the grand vision of 
the “One Belt, One Road”, the AIIB will also 
play a central role. The Silk Road fund will 
be the more flexible instrument, because 
China administers it alone and it requires 
no statutes. China also already possesses its 
own national institutions for funding devel-
opment aid and foreign trade, the two most 
central being the China Development Bank 
and the Export-Import Bank of China. But 
there are also numerous special funds, for 
example for funding energy and resource 
projects abroad. Every year since 2010 China 
has granted more development loans than 
the World Bank. 
But the new financial institutions initi-
ated by China and its Silk Roads vision have 
yet to pass the test of reality. Many ques-
tions, for example concerning transparency, 
labour and environmental standards, con-
ditionality and tendering, remain unan-
swered. As the mixed experiences of West-
ern development aid have shown, a lack of 
investment capital is not the most problem-
atic bottleneck. The failure of numerous 
large-scale projects that looked good on 
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paper should serve as a warning that with-
out good governance and capable adminis-
trative institutions in the receiving coun-
tries it is almost impossible to adhere to 
budgets and timetables or to keep newly 
acquired modern infrastructure properly 
maintained. China has already repeatedly 
learned the hard way that its own develop-
ment experience cannot simply be trans-
planted elsewhere. 
Lessons from the AIIB 
Responses to the AIIB Initiative 
The memorandum of understanding on 
founding the AIIB was signed on 24 October 
2014 by twenty-one Asian states: Bangla-
desh, Brunei, Cambodia, China, India, 
Kazakhstan, Kuwait, Laos, Malaysia, Mon-
golia, Myanmar, Nepal, Oman, Pakistan, 
the Philippines, Qatar, Singapore, Sri 
Lanka, Thailand, Uzbekistan and Vietnam. 
The only ASEAN nation missing from the 
list was Indonesia, citing its very recent 
change of government. 
Washington eyes the AIIB and China’s 
other initiatives with great scepticism. In 
essence they are regarded as competition 
for Western-dominated institutions and a 
challenge to America’s traditional suprem-
acy. While this stance brought no negative 
consequences for the BRICS bank or the Silk 
Road initiatives, the United States not only 
refused to participate in the AIIB, but re-
portedly even exerted diplomatic pressure 
on “allies and friends” to refrain from sup-
porting it. The US Administration says it 
doubts that the new bank will adopt high 
environmental, tendering and human 
rights standards. 
At first Washington was listened to: 
Influential nations in the region such as 
Japan, South Korea and Australia were 
negative or at least hesitant. But in the sub-
sequent months other states – including a 
number of US allies – decided to join the 
list of prospective founding members before 
the deadline expired (31 March 2015). Japan 
is now the only major Asian nation not to 
join. Countries like Australia and South 
Korea justified their change of heart largely 
with the argument that it made more sense 
to influence the AIIB’s structure and pro-
cedures from within than to criticise from 
outside. 
Taiwan also sought to join. Alongside 
other questions, clarification of its designa-
tion will be needed, since China does not 
recognise Taiwan as a sovereign state. As 
“Taipei, China”, it is already a member of 
the ADB and APEC. While Beijing has re-
jected Taiwan joining as a founding mem-
ber, it has not excluded later membership. 
After initial hesitation, the World Bank, 
IMF and ADB welcomed the founding of a 
new regional development bank. Following 
a meeting with Liqun Jin, secretary general 
of AIIB’s Interim Secretariat, the Japanese 
president of the ADB, Takehiko Nakao, even 
announced that the ADB would fund proj-
ects jointly with the AIIB. 
China also invited European states to 
join. While the US and Japanese positions 
made any common G7 stance an unrealistic 
proposition, discussions did take place 
between EU member states. These did not, 
however, lead to an agreed and coordinated 
course of action. 
The United Kingdom was the first coun-
try in the EU to declare its willingness to 
join the AIIB as a founding member, on 
13 March 2015. France, Italy and Germany 
followed a few days later, with a joint decla-
ration attributing the new bank a positive 
role for the region’s economic and social de-
velopment and for global growth. London’s 
decision was surprising in light of Wash-
ington’s negative stance, and the Obama 
Administration criticised Britain’s “con-
stant accommodation” of China. 
Other European states followed the UK 
example. The AIIB’s website lists Denmark, 
Finland, Luxembourg, Malta, the Nether-
lands, Portugal, Poland, Spain and Sweden 
as prospective founding members from the 
European Union, alongside non-EU-mem-
bers Iceland, Norway and Switzerland. 
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Undermining or Complementing 
Established Institutions? 
Opinions diverge over whether China is 
seeking to undermine the still Western-
dominated financial institutions estab-
lished following the Second World War and 
replace them with its own alternative sys-
tem, or whether these are in fact sensible or 
even vital additions where China is acting 
as the “responsible stakeholder” the West 
has long been calling for. The associated 
question of whether these Chinese moves 
mark the beginning of the end of Western 
domination is equally contested. Even with-
in the United States several think tanks have 
criticised the US stance as a missed oppor-
tunity and interpreted China’s agenda as 
more of a modest reform than a frontal 
attack on the established institutions. 
The notion that the NDB and AIIB could 
play complementary roles is supported by 
predictions of infrastructure needs of devel-
oping countries and emerging economies 
published by the established multilateral 
development banks themselves. The ADB 
estimates the capital required for infra-
structure investment between 2010 and 
2020 at $8.29 trillion for Asia alone. The 
World Bank assumes that developing coun-
tries and emerging economies globally will 
require about 7 percent of GDP, which is 
equivalent to an annual investment volume 
of about $2 trillion. These numbers exceed 
the capacity of the established institutions, 
providing a gap for the new development 
banks to fill. With authorised capital ex-
ceeding $160 billion and a triple-A rating, 
the ADB will remain the most important 
lender for infrastructure and other develop-
ment cooperation in Asia for the foresee-
able future. But the AIIB, the NDB and 
China’s other bilateral funding facilities 
possess sufficient reserves to fill future in-
frastructure funding gaps in Asia – and 
elsewhere too. 
In general there is much to suggest that 
China’s intentions are not revisionist. In-
stead, the country is seeking to play a politi-
cal role within the existing global economic 
system commensurate to its economic 
weight. Ultimately China owes most of its 
economic advances of recent years to 
its ever closer integration into the global 
economy. The United States and Europe are 
the main markets for China’s exports and 
its most essential sources of investment, 
know-how and technology. Moreover, China 
is in no sense taking leave of the existing 
formats, but is in fact demonstrating greater 
willingness to participate more actively 
there too. In the guise of Justin Lin, China 
provided the World Bank’s chief economist 
from 2008 the 2012, while Zhu Min has 
been deputy managing director of the IMF 
since 2011. With industrial policy and the 
principle of capital controls, China has 
made its mark at the World Bank and the 
IMF. In 2016 China will chair the G20 for 
the first time, and host a summit on Chi-
nese soil. Beijing is demonstrably pursuing 
its own goals and interests both within the 
established multilateral system and by set-
ting up its own structures. So it is conceiv-
able that the new development banks cre-
ated by China and other countries might in 
fact spur the reform process in the Bretton 
Woods institutions. The World Bank and 
the G20 also placed infrastructure invest-
ment on their agendas at the end of 2014. 
There is no sign that China and the other 
emerging economies are seeking to re-
invent the wheel, in the sense of introduc-
ing completely new rules, standards and 
procedures under which the new financial 
institutions will function. All those in-
volved must be aware that relaxing con-
ditions would mean greater default risks. 
And like any bank, the AIIB will have to 
insist on repayment of principal and inter-
est. Instead of a revision, it would be more 
accurate to speak of an adaptive evolution 
of the Bretton Woods system. The new 
BRICS reserve fund (CRA), for example, is 
already tied to the IMF by its statutes: Just 
like the Asian currency fund of the Chiang 
Mai Initiative, 70 percent of its pool can be 
tapped only under observance of IMF con-
ditionalities. In the case of the AIIB there 
were consultations with the World Bank 
from the outset, and for its charter Beijing 
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hired a lawyer who had worked for the 
World Bank for three decades. Personnel 
is recruited globally. 
One important task of the European and 
Asian member states will be to ensure, as 
founding members and prospective super-
visory board members, that the AIIB sets 
and observes high standards in the fields 
of human rights, social and environmental 
protections, compliance and governance. 
In view of the great infrastructure needs, 
a constructive stance is appropriate. To 
brand the new Chinese initiatives from the 
outset as anti-Western attempts to dismantle 
the existing system will only feed into the 
widely held Chinese belief that the US and 
the West are trying to keep the country 
down and imposing a policy of containment. 
In the meantime, the United States and 
Japan have also modified their rejection of 
the AIIB. At a joint press conference at the 
White House during a visit by Japanese 
Prime Minister Shinzo Abe in early May 
2015, President Obama declared that the 
Bank could play a positive role if it adhered 
to high lending standards. Abe stressed the 
importance of “fair governance”. But this 
shift will do nothing to blunt widespread 
criticism, even within the United States, 
that Washington handled this issue in a 
clumsy and counterproductive way. 
Lessons for Europe 
Thirteen EU member states successively 
accepted the invitation to join the AIIB. 
The uncoordinated nature of the European 
response is unfortunate. For present and 
upcoming positioning, a better-coordinated 
political discussion within the European 
Union would be desirable. The diverse Chi-
nese initiatives must be discussed together, 
with the two Silk Roads forming the back-
bone holding them all together. The new 
development banks, the investment funds 
and the state banks are all intended to serve 
as financing instruments for projects under 
the “One Belt, One Road” vision. 
Reform of voting rights in the established 
financial institutions is not to be expected, 
since it requires approval by the US Con-
gress. But at the regular five-yearly review, 
the IMF’s members will soon have to decide 
whether to include the renminbi in the cur-
rency basket that determines the value and 
composition of its special drawing rights. 
The currencies currently represented are 
the US dollar (41.9 percent), the euro (37.4 
percent), the yen (9.4 percent) and the Brit-
ish pound (11.3 percent). The criteria for 
acceptance are the country’s share of world 
exports and whether the currency is freely 
usable. China may have made considerable 
progress on the latter point, but restrictions 
on movement of capital persist and the 
domestic bond market remains under-
developed. Nonetheless, a political decision 
should be made to include the renminbi 
in the basket, in a sense as a statement of 
confidence. But this step should be tied to 
conditions concerning liberalisation and 
opening of capital markets. 
With respect to the Silk Roads, the 
European states and the European Union 
need to act in unison and not allow them-
selves to be divided by exclusive agreements 
between China and individual member 
states. The ongoing talks on a European-
Chinese investment agreement should also 
pay heed to China’s interest in physical 
connectivity to Europe. In its Silk Roads 
vision Beijing has already included the 
“16+1” format, a regular meeting with six-
teen central and eastern European states 
including five non-EU members. A number 
of Chinese infrastructure projects in that 
region have been agreed, such as the mod-
ernisation of the Budapest–Belgrade rail 
line. 
From the European perspective the Asia-
Europe Meeting (ASEM) offers a broader 
platform for the two Silk Road initiatives. 
Because of its composition and size – fifty-
one European and Asian members plus the 
European Commission and the ASEAN Sec-
retariat – it could form an appropriate 
framework. Possible forms of cooperation 
and the necessary conditions could be best 
raised here, supported by sectoral meetings, 
for example of the transport ministers. 
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